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I. INTRODUCTION
Judges in criminal proceedings impose sentences every day, mind-
ful of the often-lasting effects their actions will have on the parties before
them and on law and public policy beyond the courtroom. In particular,
criminal sentences have a tendency to wreak havoc in the lives of defen-
dants and their families long after time is served in jail.1 Perhaps no-
where are the issues surrounding the consequences of a criminal convic-
tion more severe and controversial than in the complex intersection of
state sentencing actions and federal deportation law, where the former
can either trigger or, as this Comment discusses, stifle operation of the
latter. As the following story illustrates, the possibility that a criminal
conviction may result in the harsh consequence of deportation can factor
heavily in a judge's exercise of discretion at sentencing. But where such
sentences run afoul of federal immigration law under the Constitution,2
neither precedent nor policy will sustain them.
On June 27, 2004, three men assaulted and stabbed twenty-three-
year-old Micah Painter with a broken bottle after he left a tavern in Seat-
tle's Capitol Hill neighborhood.3 While there were varying accounts of
t J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2008; B.A., International Studies, The Union
Institute, 1997. The author wishes to thank his wife, daughter, and mother-in-law, whose patience
and support have made law school possible. The author would also like to thank his professional
colleagues for their willingness to accommodate his academic obligations. Finally, the author would
like to thank Laura Edwards and the entire editing team for their contributions, as well as the au-
thor's beleaguered colleagues in the evening law program for their support.
1. See, e.g., Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 585,
585-90 (2006) (discussing consequences such as loss of some public benefits, civil rights, and pos-
sible deportation).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3. Amended Information at 1, State v. Samusenko, No. 04-C-02026-0 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct.
2004).
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the exact words used by Painter's assailants, all accounts agreed that the
men aimed their rage at his sexual orientation. One account alleged that
an attacker yelled, "You're going to die, faggot!"4 Such a brutal attack,
in the heart of Seattle's most prominent gay and lesbian neighborhood
during Gay Pride weekend, sparked considerable media attention 5 as po-
lice searched for the suspects.
It was not until nearly three weeks later that police arrested three
suspects: David Kravchenko, Yevgeniy Savchak, and Vadim
Samusenko.6 Kravchenko and Savchak were eventually convicted of
Assault in the Fourth Degree7 and Malicious Harassment,8 while
Samusenko was convicted of Assault in the Second Degree.9 Thus, this
is not a tale of injustice in the traditional sense. The men who savagely
attacked Micah Painter were ordered jailed for nearly a year, with
Savchak and Kravchenko each receiving sentences of 364 days.'0
As Russian nationals," however, the consequences for these two
men could have been much more severe.' 2 Under federal immigration
law, both men could have been classified as "aggravated felons"' 3 for
immigration purposes, which can result in the initiation of deportation
proceedings.14 In the cases of Savchak and Kravchenko, being convicted
of a "crime of violence"'15 would render them aggravated felons, so long
4. Supplemental Prosecuting Attorney Case Summary at 1, Samusenko, No. 04-C-02026-0
SEA.
5. See, e.g., Hector Castro, Seattle Man Recovering from Hate Crime Attack Spurs Gay Com-
munity, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 10, 2004, at B I; see also Rally Decries Beating on
Gay-Pride Weekend, SEATTLE TIMES, July 12, 2004, at B3.
6. Amended Information, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Judgment and Sentence Non-Felony at 1, State v. Kravchenko, No. 04-C-02027-8 SEA
(Wash. Super. Ct. 2005); Judgment and Sentence Non-Felony at 1, State v. Savchak, No. 04-C-
02097-9 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 2005).
8. Judgment and Sentence Felony at 1, Kravchenko, No. 04-C-02027-8 SEA; Judgment and
Sentence Felony at 1, Savchak, No. 04-C-02097-9 SEA.
9. Judgment and Sentence Felony at 1, Samusenko, No. 04-C-02026-0 SEA.
10. Judgment and Sentence Non-Felony at 1, Kravchenko, No. 04-C-02027-8 SEA; Judgment
and Sentence Non-Felony at 1, Savchak, No. 04-C-02097-9 SEA.
11. Media accounts reflected that Savchak and Kravchenko were Russian citizens. E.g., Chris-
tina Clarridge, 3 Found Guilty of Harassing Gay Man, SEATTLE TIMES, March 31, 2005, at B2.
12. As a result of their acts, Savchak and Kravchenko became convicted felons. Assault in the
Fourth Degree is a gross misdemeanor. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.041(2) (2006). Malicious har-
assment is a class C felony. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080(7) (2006).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006).
14. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
15. "Crime of violence" for immigration purposes is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2007). Note
that the fact that Washington State law defines Assault in the Fourth Degree as a gross misdemeanor
does not affect the conviction potentially being classified as an aggravated felony for immigration
purposes. The determinative factors are whether the violation is a crime "of violence," and the
length of sentence. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
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as they were sentenced to at least one year in jail.16 But the defendants
did not receive sentences of at least one year; instead, they escaped that
last, crucial prong by one day. 17 Attorneys for both men were aware of
the difference one day could make, and the judge imposed sentence ac-
cordingly, expressing his hope that the men could avoid deportation.'
8
Efforts in criminal courts to avoid deportation as a result of convic-
tions are prevalent throughout the United States.' 9 Although defendants
in Washington have a statutory right to be advised of the potential immi-
gration consequences of a guilty plea,2° there is no statutory or constitu-
tional requirement that a judge take immigration consequences into con-
sideration in imposing sentence. 21 Nonetheless, as was the case in the
assault on Micah Painter, judges can and do make what are effectively
policy judgments when sentencing defendants, with an eye toward help-
ing them avoid deportation.
Division Three of the Washington Court of Appeals recently con-
sidered such a situation in the case of State v. Quintero Morelos, where
an alien22 defendant was initially sentenced to 365 days in jail for Assault
in the Fourth Degree, Domestic Violence. 23 Upon learning that this sen-
tence could make him deportable as an aggravated felon, the defendant
16. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(F). A sentence includes the period of confinement ordered by a
court, regardless of any suspension of imposition or execution of the sentence. Id. § 1101 (a)(48)(B).
17. Judgment and Sentence Non-Felony at 1, Kravchenko, No. 04-C-02027-8 SEA; Judgment
and Sentence Non-Felony at 1, Savchak, No. 04-C-02097-9 SEA.
18. See Christina Clarridge, 2 Men Sentenced to Year for Assault, SEATTLE TIMES, April 23,
2005, at B 1. Savchak's attorney was quoted in the media as having asked for a sentence of "under a
year... so that [Savchak] doesn't get a life sentence." Id.
19. This prevalence is illustrated by the frequency with which similar issues are addressed in
practice materials and by various courts. See, e.g., People v. Bautista, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 862, 870 n.8
(Ct. App. 2004) ("Another technique [for avoiding deportation] ... is to obtain a disposition for 364
days instead of 365 days."); State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2006) (defendant sought re-
sentencing to no more than 364 days in order to avoid deportation); People v. Ping Cheung, 718
N.Y.S.2d 578 (2000) (defendant resentenced to 364 days to avoid deportation); Brian Bates, Good
Ideas Gone Bad: Plea Bargains and Resident Aliens, 66 TEX. B.J. 878, 882 (2003) (advising that
noncitizen defendants "would be much better off' actually serving 364 days in jail, as opposed to
accepting a one-year suspended sentence, where the latter would make the defendant an aggravated
felon).
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200(2) (2006). There is no requirement that defendants pro-
ceeding to trial, such as Savchak and Kravchenko, be similarly advised. Other states have enacted
statutes with similar aims related to alien defendants. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West
2007).
21. Due process requires that guilty pleas be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
E.g., State v. Korum, 157 Wash. 2d 614, 667, 141 P.3d 13, 41 (2006) (Madsen, J., dissenting). De-
portation, however, has been held to be a collateral rather than direct consequence of a guilty plea,
which does not affect the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary character of a plea. In re Yim, 139
Wash. 2d 581, 588, 989 P.2d 512, 516 (1999).
22. An "alien" is defined as a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(3) (2006).
23. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 594, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (2006).
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24moved the court to reduce the sentence by one day. At the second sen-
tencing, the judge stated, "[I]f I had known that [one day] would make a
difference, I would have imposed 364 days .... ,2S On appeal, the State
argued that the trial court's ruling violated the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution,2 6 in that it interfered with the operation of federal im-
migration law.27 In dismissing the State's argument as "without merit, 28
the court reasoned that the Supremacy Clause applied to statutes, not
court rulings, and that the trial judge was simply "acknowledging ...
[that] federal law has the potential to influence the actual punishment
visited upon a criminal defendant ....,,9
The trial court's ruling in Quintero Morelos, as affirmed on appeal,
violates the Supremacy Clause under multiple tests30 and conflicts with
related case law concerning deportation orders at sentencing. First, the
court's action amounted to an impermissible regulation of federal depor-
tation matters where Congress has implicitly prohibited state regulation
through its occupation of the entire field respecting deportation law.
Second, the court's action directly conflicted with federal law, to the ex-
tent that it rendered an otherwise deportable defendant non-deportable
under a particular statute. Third, because the Quintero Morelos court
could not have ordered the defendant's deportation, it was equally with-
out power to effectively prevent his deportation.
Part II of this Comment briefly discusses the history of federal im-
migration regulation and recent efforts by Congress to ensure that aliens
convicted of serious crimes, such as Micah Painter's assailants, are ame-
nable to deportation. Part II also lays out the framework of the immigra-
tion legal system, in which noncitizen defendants can avail themselves of
due process in a setting intended to properly address the serious ques-
tions surrounding potential deportation. Part III discusses Quintero Mo-
relos and the problems with the court's analysis, subsequently arguing
that the case's holding not only conflicts with traditional Supremacy
Clause principles but also fails to follow related precedent concerning
deportation orders by state sentencing judges. Having discussed the
legal arguments against Quintero Morelos, Part IV discusses two public
24. Id. at 595, 137 P.3d at 116.
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
27. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. at 599, 137 P.3d at 118.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 600, 137 P.3d at 119.
30. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts actions by state judges and enactments
by state legislatures in many cases. Preemption occurs where: (1) Congress expressly prohibits state
regulation of an area; (2) Congress implicitly prohibits state regulation by occupying an entire field;
or (3) state regulation directly conflicts with or frustrates federal law. E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001).
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policy arguments that militate against both state and federal courts in-
truding into the complex issues surrounding deportation. Finally, Part V
concludes that defendants such as Quintero Morelos and the individuals
who brutally beat Micah Painter should be sentenced as any U.S. citizen
would, without regard to what immigration consequences might follow.
II. FEDERAL POWER OVER IMMIGRATION AND CONCERN WITH
CRIMINAL ALIENS
The development of immigration law through the Constitution and
the entire body of subsequent jurisprudence reflects that immigration
matters are exclusively under the auspices of the federal government,
which has developed a system specifically structured to address the pos-
sible deportation of aliens. This Part first outlines the constitutional and
judicial underpinnings of federal control over immigration law. The Part
continues with a discussion of the public safety concerns that have
prompted Congress to focus on deporting criminals. Finally, the Part
concludes with an overview of the vast immigration legal system that
affords parties due process in a setting specifically designed to handle the
complex workings of immigration law.
A. The Federal Government Controls Immigration
That federal law is the supreme law of the land is not only promul-
gated in the U.S. Constitution 3' but also accepted by the nation's highest
court 32 and enshrined in the Washington State Constitution. 33 The Fed-
eral Constitution provides that Congress has the power to establish a uni-
form rule of naturalization 34-that is, who may attain United States citi-
zenship and under what circumstances-a power that has also been rec-
ognized by Washington courts.35 The federal government also has broad
constitutional powers in determining which aliens shall be admitted to
the United States, how long they may remain, and how their conduct may
be regulated.36 The states are granted no such powers and therefore
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317 (1819) ("The states have no
power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations
of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into effect the powers vested in the national
government.").
33. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 2.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
35. See, e.g., Hsieh v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 529, 536, 488 P.2d 515, 519 (1971) ("It is a matter
of long established federal law that Congress has the exclusive power to regulate
immigration....").
36. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948).
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cannot alter the conditions Congress imposes upon the admission, resi-
dence, and naturalization of aliens.37
The U.S. Supreme Court has spoken powerfully in several cases to
federal control of immigration. The Court has remarked that "over no
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete"
than it is over the admission of aliens.38 In striking down a state alien
registration statute in light of pre-existing federal regulation in the same
area, the Court explained:
That the supremacy of the national power ... over immigration,
naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution
was pointed out by authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has
since been given continuous recognition by this Court ....
When the national government by treaty or statute has estab-
lished rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, obli-
gations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or statute is the
supreme law of the land. No state can add to or take from the
force and effect of such treaty or statute.39
Thus, the courts have explicitly stated that immigration law falls exclu-
sively to the federal government. Furthermore, as a subset of the federal
government's overall immigration scheme, the laws surrounding deporta-
tion have increasingly focused on criminal activity in recent years.
B. Congress Has Focused Deportation Efforts on Aliens
Convicted of Crimes
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), which, among other things, re-
duced, from five years to one year, the minimum sentence required to
make a crime of violence an aggravated felony.40 In the debate preced-
ing the passage of the IIRIRA, there was considerable discussion of fo-
cusing the federal government's ultimately limited resources on "crimi-
nal aliens.",41 During this debate, Senator Spencer Abraham made clear
that he drew "a sharp distinction between immigrants who come to this
country to make better lives for themselves and those who come to break
our laws and prey upon our citizens.' ' 2 In addition to the changes to
37. Id.
38. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909).
39. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1941); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n.19 (1982) (explaining that it is "the federal prerogative to control access to the United
States .... No State may independently exercise a like power.").
40. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321,
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-627 (1996).
41. 142 CONG. REC. S11872-01 (1996).
42. Id. at S11886.
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immigration law under the IIRIRA, congressional concerns with public
safety and a desire to focus limited resources on criminal aliens have
translated into dramatic increases in funding and enforcement efforts in
the years since the Act's passage. For instance, for 2007, Congress ap-
propriated more than $9 billion to the agencies within the Department of
Homeland Security charged with enforcing the nation's federal immigra-
tion laws.43
Congressional concern with criminal aliens has also meant provid-
ing aid to state and local correctional institutions that are impacted by
immigration enforcement efforts. In 2005, nearly seven percent of all
prisoners held in federal and state correctional facilities were not U.S.
citizens, 44 many of whom were subject to possible deportation. In re-
sponse to the number of non-U.S. citizen inmates in state facilities, the
U.S. Department of Justice administers the State Criminal Alien Assis-
tance Program ("SCAAP"). 45 Through SCAAP, the federal government
provides funding to state and local institutions holding inmates subject to
deportation; some of that funding has been channeled to the State of
Washington. Funding data for fiscal year 2005 reflects that twenty-nine
Washington counties and the State Department of Corrections submitted
funding requests to SCAAP.46 These requests included claims that some
2500 deportable aliens had spent a combined total of more than 300,000
days in various Washington detention facilities during the fiscal year, or
approximately three percent of all inmate days. 47  The Washington
SCAAP claims resulted in approximately $3.5 million in reimbursements
to the various counties and the State of Washington, representing nearly
1.5% of the combined correctional budgets for those submitting claims.48
Together, the Washington claims, and those of other states, resulted in
more than $287 million in federal payments to states incarcerating
43. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006).
44. See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR
2005 1 (2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf.
45. SCAAP is authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(i) (2006). SCAAP provides federal payments
to states and localities that incur correctional officer salary costs for incarcerating undocumented
criminal aliens with at least one felony or two misdemeanor convictions for violations of state or
local law and who are incarcerated for at least four consecutive days during the reporting period.
Bureau of Justice Assistance, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/scaap.html (last visited Mar. 24,
2007).
46. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
FY 2005 SCAAP PAYMENT LIST (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/05SCAAP.pdf.
47. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, SCAAP REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2005 (2006),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/05SCAAP_Data 1.pdf (discussing program data by state).
48. See id.
20071
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deportable aliens in 2005, 49 further evidencing congressional interest in
the deportation of criminal aliens.
C. Aliens Amenable to Deportation Have Access to the Courts
Were criminal aliens such as Quintero Morelos, Kravchenko, and
Savchak to be placed in deportation proceedings, they would enter a le-
gal system that mirrors and intersects with the federal judiciary at several
points. This system affords aliens due process in a setting specifically
tailored to decide the complex issues that often arise under immigration
law.50  This setting is partially embodied in The Executive Office for
Immigration Review, which was established in 1983 as a separate agency
within the U.S. Department of Justice to adjudicate immigration cases.5'
The agency includes both courts of first resort in several major U.S. cit-
ies, staffed by administrative law judges, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals, which hears appeals from the lower immigration courts.
52
Within this immigration court system, aliens do have a right to counsel,
though not at government expense.53 Additionally, aliens in deportation
proceedings in the immigration court system may generally appeal an
unfavorable decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals. 54 Moreover, aliens can and do appeal the latter
appellate decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court under certain circum-
stances.55 Thus, taken as a whole, this system is similar in many respects
to federal and state civil and criminal systems, yet is uniquely set up to
handle immigration matters that judges outside the system cannot.
49. Bureau of Justice Assistance, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/O5SCAAP.html (last
visited June 17, 2007).
50. See, e.g., Del Toro-Chacon v. Chertoff, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(detained alien entitled to individualized bond hearing); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2006)
(alien entitled to cross-examine witnesses in deportation proceedings).
51. The Executive Office for Immigration Review was established by statute under 6 U.S.C. §
521 (a) (2006).
52. See generally I Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 1:145 (2006) (discussing the overall structure
and functions of the immigration legal system).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
54. See generally 3B AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1650 (2006). But see 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(C) (2006) (proscribing judicial review of orders of deportation entered against aliens
found deportable by virtue of conviction for certain crimes).
55. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 433 (1999) (holding that lower court had
incorrectly overturned a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals with respect to granting an
alien relief from deportation).
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III. WHY STATE JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE WITH FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
LAW VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
Having discussed how immigration and the deportation of criminal
aliens is the concern of the federal government, this Comment next in-
troduces a number of interrelated legal arguments against criminal courts
interfering in this area. This Part begins with a detailed discussion of the
holding from Quintero Morelos, which provides context for the argu-
ments against the court's rationale that follow. Next, this Part discusses
why decisions of state judges in this context are no less confined by the
Supremacy Clause than are state statutes. Contending that decisions by
state judges do fall under the Supremacy Clause, this Part then discusses
several independent legal arguments against state judges acting to affect
a defendant's deportability. Though these arguments are discussed with
respect to the specific holding in Quintero Morelos, they apply with
equal force to similar actions by any state sentencing judge.
A. The Holding from Quintero Morelos
After the jury in Quintero Morelos found the defendant guilty of
Assault in the Fourth Degree, Domestic Violence, the trial judge imposed
a one-year sentence, suspending all but thirty-five days, conditioned on
the defendant's good behavior.56 The judge went even further by con-
verting thirty days to community service, leaving the defendant only five
days to serve in jail.57 Defense counsel did not object to the length of the
sentence, which was consistent with the statute.58 Following the initial
sentencing, however, defense counsel learned from another attorney that
the 365-day sentence could lead to deportation, and the defendant moved
to modify his sentence. 59 The court granted the request for a modified
sentence, finding that the defense attorney's failure to raise the possibil-
ity of deportation at the time of sentencing was "excusable neglect., 60 In
granting the request, the sentencing judge stated, "[I]f I had known that
[one day] would make a difference, I would have imposed 364
days . ,,6 1 The State appealed this new sentence, arguing that the trial
court had not only abused its discretion 62 but also violated the Supremacy
Clause by circumventing immigration law at sentencing.6 3 Though the
56. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 594, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (2006).
57. Id.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(2) (2007).
59. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. at 595, 137 P.3d at 116.
60. See WASH. Civ. R. 7.8(b)(1) (stating that a court may relieve a party from final judgment
for excusable neglect in obtaining ajudgment or order).
61. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. at 595, 137 P.3d at 116.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 599, 137 P.3d at 118.
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court of appeals also held against the State as to its abuse-of-discretion
argument,64 it was especially dismissive of the State's Supremacy Clause
argument, characterizing it as "without merit.,
65
Although the court of appeals found no merit in the State's argu-
ment, the court's explanation of the various tests for violation of the Su-
premacy Clause was incorrect, making it nearly impossible for any con-
trary argument to succeed. Under the three leading tests for violation of
the Supremacy Clause, preemption exists when: (1) Congress expressly
prohibits state regulation of an area; (2) Congress implicitly preempts
state law by occupying an entire field; or (3) a state regulation conflicts
with or frustrates federal law.66 In contrast to these three separate tests,
the Quintero Morelos court laid out a rule that collapsed all three tests
into one, which it explained as follows:
State law is preempted if Congress passes a statute that expressly
preempts it. Congress then occupies an entire field of regulation.
State law that conflicts with federal law, making compliance
with both an impossibility, or state law that presents an obstacle
to accomplishing this federal purpose then violates the
Supremacy Clause ...67
The Quintero Morelos court's explanation of the rules surrounding ap-
plication of the Supremacy Clause appears to amount to a single test,
which as a preliminary matter requires that Congress has expressly pre-
empted state regulation. In asserting that "Congress then occupies an
entire field,, 68 the court implied that Congress must first act expressly if
it wishes to occupy an entire field. The court went further by explaining
that, once Congress has expressly occupied an entire field, state law that
conflicts with or presents an obstacle to federal law "then violates the
Supremacy Clause., 69 Thus, having already implied that Congress must
be express in occupying a particular field, the Quintero Morelos court
compounded that requirement with the further need to find a conflict be-
tween state and federal law within the field. But the Quintero Morelos
court was incorrect in tying express preemption to field preemption.
While express preemption can best be thought of as an explicit statement
from Congress to the states to stay out of a particular area, field preemp-
tion is an entirely separate test that arises by implication when Congress
64. Id. at 600, 137 P.3d at 119.
65. Id. at 599, 137 P.3d at 118.
66. E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001).
67. 133 Wash. App. at 599, 137 P.3d at 118 (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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occupies an entire field, leaving no room for the states. 70 Moreover, in
then tying conflict preemption to the already conflated express- and
field-preemption tests, the Quintero Morelos court lumped yet a third
Supremacy Clause test into a single rule. Thus, with all of the leading
Supremacy Clause tests consolidated into one, the State could not have
succeeded even if the court had given its argument more than a perfunc-
tory review.
Following its explanation of the applicable Supremacy Clause
analysis, the Quintero Morelos court declined to even apply even its own
rule, holding that "federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause ap-
plies to statutes, not court rulings., 71 This conclusion allowed the court
to stop short of performing more than a cursory analysis of whether the
trial court's modification of the defendant's sentence to avoid deporta-
tion improperly intruded upon federal power to regulate immigration.
Additionally, though the court cited some of the elements necessary to
analyze the application of the Supremacy Clause, it quickly concluded
that the trial court's actions were within the state's traditional police
powers and thus did not offend the Federal Constitution.72
B. The Supremacy Clause Does Apply to Actions by State Judges
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.73
The court's holding in Quintero Morelos that the Supremacy
Clause does not apply to the actions of state judges contradicts the plain
language of the Clause and is not consistent with case law. Thus, as a
threshold matter, this section first shows that the Supremacy Clause does
indeed apply to actions by state sentencing judges, including the sentence
handed down in Quintero Morelos.
1. The Plain Language of the Supremacy
Clause Applies to Judges
The first argument in favor of applying the Supremacy Clause to
the sentencing judge's actions in Quintero Morelos is the plain language
70. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 540--41.
71. 133 Wash. App. at 600, 137 P.3d at 119.
72. Id.
73. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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of the Clause itself, which states in relevant part that "Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby., 74 No clause in the Constitution is to be
read in such a way as to render it effectively meaningless. 75 Yet, if this
language does not mean that the Clause applies to actions by the judici-
ary, it is difficult to conceive of to what it would apply. Moreover,
though there is no question of the Clause's applicability to laws enacted
by state legislatures, judges are the only state officials specifically refer-
enced in the Clause.7 6 Additionally, giving the court's holding its broad-
est interpretation would mean that state judges are free to issue rulings
that run counter to federal law, no matter how subtle or pronounced the
effect is. In this case, that effect was to deny the federal government the
opportunity to initiate deportation proceedings, despite Congress's desire
that aliens convicted of crimes of violence be subject to deportation.77
2. Case Law Supports Application of the
Supremacy Clause to State Judicial Actions
Though the court in Quintero Morelos cited case law supporting the
Supremacy Clause's application to statutes,78 those cases do not stand for
the additional proposition that the Clause has no application beyond stat-
utes. To the contrary, a number of federal cases have applied Supremacy
Clause analysis to state policies that were alleged to have conflicted with
federal law. For example, the court in Equal Access Education v.
Merten79 applied the Supremacy Clause in upholding a state policy deny-
ing college admission to aliens who had come to the United States
unlawfully. 80 In its decision, the Merten court applied the analytical
framework from a leading Supremacy Clause case that also dealt with
immigration issues: DeCanas v. Bica.81 Noting the scope of the Suprem-
acy Clause, the Merten court stated that "[w]hile there is no statute at
issue in this case, the parties do not dispute that a state policy [relates]..
. to the same analysis."8 2 In upholding the policy under the Supremacy
Clause, the fact that the state was acting consistently with federal stan-
dards was significant to the court.83 Also significant to the court were
the facts that Congress had not evidenced a "clear and manifest purpose"
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
76. U.S. CONST. art. Vi, cl. 2.
77. See supra Part ll.B.
78. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 600, 137 P.3d 114, 119 (2006).
79. 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
80. Id. at 601-05.
81. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
82. 305 F. Supp. 2d at 602 n.14 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 603.
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to oust the state in this area 84 and that the policy was not otherwise pre-
empted.
8 5
In Toll v. Moreno, the U.S. Supreme Court held, employing a simi-
lar rationale, that a state policy denying in-state tuition to certain lawfully
admitted aliens ran afoul of the Supremacy Clause. 86 In striking down
the policy, the Court found that Congress could not have anticipated the
burden the policy would impose because Congress had specifically pro-
vided conditions under which the aliens could be lawfully domiciled.87
Thus, in both Merten and Toll, the courts applied the Supremacy Clause
to state policies rather than statutes, which undermines the Quintero Mo-
relos court's assertion that the Clause is limited to statutes.88
It might be argued that the policies in cases such as Merten and Toll
are more similar to a statute than to a sentence in state court, and thus
that those cases do not necessarily support the application of the Su-
premacy Clause to the actions of state judges. When a state judge effec-
tively overrides a congressional purpose, however, the judge may indeed
violate the Supremacy Clause. For example, in Nass v. Local 348, Ware-
house Production, Sales & Services Employees Union,89 a union official
was convicted of corruption charges in state court.90 Under federal law,91
that state conviction would have barred the official from further holding
union office.9 2 Contemporaneously with the official's sentencing, how-
ever, the state court issued him a "certificate of relief from civil disabili-
ties," which prevented the adjudication from rising to the level of a con-
viction for purposes of bringing to bear the federal statute.93
The question presented in Nass was "whether a State court's deter-
mination that an individual should not suffer the loss of certain rights
following a conviction may override the intention of Congress to purge
unions of illegal influences through the actions of their employees and
officers. 94 In summarizing its findings that the state court violated the
Supremacy Clause, the court stated:
84. Id. at 607.
85. Id. at 607-08.
86. 458 U.S. 1, 9 (1982).
87. Id. at 14.
88. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 600, 137 P.3d 114, 119 (2006).
89. Nass v. Local 348, Warehouse Prod., Sales and Servs. Employees Union, 503 F. Supp. 217
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
90. Id. at 218.
91.29 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
92. Nass, 503 F. Supp. at 218.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 219.
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We are presented not with conflicting federal policies but with a
conflict between State and federal policies. To allow a certifi-
cate of relief from civil disabilities issued by the State concur-
rently with the pronouncement of sentence for a crime involving
corruption of a union officer to bar the operation of [federal law]
would be to frustrate and override federal law in violation of the
Supremacy Clause.95
The similarities between the judges' actions in Nass and Quintero More-
los are readily apparent. Each state judge exercised discretion in order to
effectively prevent the operation of federal law. Neither the judge in
Nass96 nor the judge in Quintero Morelos was required to help the defen-
dant avoid the federal consequences of his state sentence. But each
judge nevertheless chose to do so, thereby violating the Supremacy
Clause in the process.
Because the Supremacy Clause applies to more than just state stat-
utes, a traditional analysis under leading tests97 can be undertaken to de-
termine whether state judges may use their sentencing authority to inten-
tionally block enforcement of federal immigration law without running
afoul of the Clause.
C. Supremacy Clause Analytical Framework
The U.S. Supreme Court, in DeCanas v. Bica,98 provided a detailed
analysis of the issue of state regulation of federal immigration matters
that also applies to the question of whether a state sentencing judge can
act to affect a defendant's deportability. The significance of the opinion
in DeCanas is that it speaks directly to the outer boundaries of state regu-
lation of immigration matters, examining whether a particular state stat-
ute could stand under the Supremacy Clause in light of essentially com-
peting federal laws.99 In holding that the state statute did not violate the
Supremacy Clause, 100 the DeCanas Court asked questions that are di-
rectly applicable to the issue faced by the court of appeals in Quintero
Morelos and to the broader question of whether state sentencing judges
can act to prevent a defendant's deportation.
DeCanas involved a California statute 1' 1 prohibiting employers
from knowingly hiring individuals not authorized to work in the United
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id at 219.
97. See supra note 31.
98. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
99. Id. at 352-53.
100. Id. at 365.
101. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (Deering 2007) (repealed 1988).
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States, where to do so would have an impact on those who were author-
ized by law to work. 10 2 The DeCanas Court held that the state statute did
not amount to an impermissible attempt to regulate immigration.'0 3 In
doing so, the Court recognized that, although the power to regulate im-
migration belongs to the federal government, it had never gone so far as
to suggest that every state enactment dealing in any way with aliens
amounted to a regulation of immigration.I4
In surveying the boundaries of permissible state regulations touch-
ing on immigration, the DeCanas Court stated that "the fact that aliens
are the subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immi-
gration, which is essentially a determination of who should or should not
be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal en-
trant may remain."' 0 5 Of particular significance to the Court was the fact
that the state statute was focused on "essentially local problems," includ-
ing the effect that unauthorized workers had on overall employment,
wages, working conditions, and organized labor.10 6 Additionally, the
Court dismissed the petitioners' argument that a federal statute that also
dealt with the employment of illegal aliens meant that the state statute
was preempted, especially where the federal scheme actually invited a
state presence.10 7 The Court explained that employment of illegal immi-
grants was only a "peripheral concern" of the federal statute, 0 8 and that
it would not strike down the state statute, even though it may have had
"some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration. '" 109 Thus,
the Court concluded that this was a valid exercise of state police powers,
absent any evidence that Congress intended to preclude harmonious
regulation with respect to the employment of aliens.'' 0
D. State Sentences Intended to Avoid Deportation
Violate the Supremacy Clause
Though harmonious state legislation with only a tangential effect
on federal immigration law may be tolerable in circumstances such as
those in DeCanas, when state courts act contrary to federal law and di-
102. 424 U.S. at 352.
103. Id. at 355.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
106. Id at 357.
107. Id. at 360-61.
108. Id. at 360.
109. Id. at 355-56.
110. Id. at 358; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (explaining that "the States do
have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal
objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal.") (emphasis added).
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rectly impact immigration, their actions will not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Such actions are prohibited under several Supremacy Clause
legal tests and should also be rejected under case law regarding deporta-
tion orders at sentencing. First, sentences intended to prevent a defen-
dant's deportation fail under the Supremacy Clause test for field preemp-
tion.' l Such sentences amount to an impermissible regulation of immi-
gration law in a field occupied by the federal government to the exclu-
sion of the states, because such sentences are essentially a state determi-
nation that an alien should remain in the United States. Second, even if it
was permissible for a state to regulate deportation law, sentences crafted
to avoid deportation are in direct conflict with federal law. Finally, out-
side of traditional Supremacy Clause analysis, existing case law-
holding that state sentences mandating deportation violate the Suprem-
acy Clause-suggests that it is equally a violation for a sentence to pre-
vent deportation.
1. The Sentences Amount to Regulations in a Field
Already Occupied by Congress
Efforts by state sentencing judges to prevent federal officials from
deporting alien defendants are impermissible de facto attempts to regu-
late deportation law that violate the Supremacy Clause for three reasons.
First, Congress has already occupied the field of deportation law to the
exclusion of the states. Second, sentences such as the one handed down
in Quintero Morelos amount to regulations in the heart of the particular
field. Finally, such sentences are not excepted from the Supremacy
Clause, as being within the realm of traditional state police powers, be-
cause the sentences are directed at national rather than local problems.
Congress has left no room for the argument that any entity outside
of the federal government has the authority to decide matters concerning
deportation. The DeCanas Court held that the state statute at issue in
that case was not preempted because there was no evidence that Con-
gress had entirely occupied the field concerning regulation of employ-
ment of aliens unlawfully present in the country. 12 To the contrary, the
Court there pointed to a federal statute that expressly provided for state
regulation of the employment of illegal aliens, if consistent with federal
law. 1 3 Thus, in effect, Congress was inviting the states to promulgate
their own, harmonious legislation with respect to the employment of ille-
gal aliens. In contrast to cases involving harmonious legislation, the
DeCanas Court distinguished cases in which state regulation touching on
I l1. See supra note 31.
112. 424 U.S. at 361.
113. Id.
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immigration was preempted by federal regulation because the states were
attempting to regulate in the heart of a field already completely occupied
by Congress.' 14
One notable case that the DeCanas Court distinguished in this re-
gard was Hines v. Davidowitz,'15 which dealt with state regulation of
immigration issues.11 6 As with DeCanas, the Court's decision in Hines
is significant to this discussion because it lays out what continues to be
the Court's application of the Supremacy Clause to state attempts to
regulate immigration. In Hines, the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania
alien registration statute under the Supremacy Clause after finding that
the state statute specifically regulated an area in which Congress had al-
ready acted with uniformity.' 17 In examining whether Congress had
acted to effectively preclude the state statute, the Hines Court described
Congress's "broad and comprehensive plan" for immigration. 8 This
plan included the fact that, if an alien "should be found guilty of conduct
contrary to the rules... laid down by Congress, he can be deported." 1 9
Thus, while the DeCanas Court upheld a state statute operating on the
periphery of immigration law where Congress had welcomed state regu-
lation, it also acknowledged that state regulations like those in Hines
failed to withstand scrutiny under the Supremacy Clause because they
drove to the heart of the regulated field.
Unlike the state statute at issue in DeCanas, the trial judge's actions
in Quintero Morelos amounted to an impermissible regulation of the
field of federal immigration law. The DeCanas Court was specific re-
garding what amounted to a regulation of immigration, which it ex-
plained included determinations of who should be allowed to stay in the
United States. 120 Yet, the record in Quintero Morelos reflects that on the
day following the initial one-year sentence, the defendant "moved to
modify his sentence to 364 days to avoid deportation.' 21 The judge
granted the defendant's request to help him avoid deportation and stated
that he would have imposed a sentence of 364 days, rather than 365 days,
if he had known one day would make a difference. 122 Therefore, in
handing down the new sentence for the purpose of preventing
114. Id. at 362.
115.312 U.S. 52 (1941).
116. See infra note 138.
117. 312 U.S. at 74.
118. Id. at 69.
119. Id. at 70.
120. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
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deportation, the judge was effectively regulating immigration law by de-
termining that Quintero Morelos should be allowed to stay in the United
States.
Additionally, in contrast to the situation the Court faced in DeCa-
nas, and similar to the situation faced by the Court in Hines, the judge in
Quintero Morelos regulated in an area that was well within Congress's
plan with respect to immigration. In discussing its version of Supremacy
Clause analysis, the Quintero Morelos court noted that, absent "a clear
and manifest congressional purpose," there is a presumption against the
preemption of state law. 123 Such a presumption, however, only applies in
instances where Congress has undertaken to legislate in a field "which
the States have traditionally occupied."'124 The assumption against pre-
emption "is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there
has been a history of significantfederalpresence."'1 25 And the history of
a significant federal presence with respect to immigration law is perhaps
longer and more established than any other area of government regula-
tion.1 26 Moreover, there is no evidence in either the broad range of fed-
eral statutes dealing with deportation or the legislative history of the
definition of aggravated felony that reflects a congressional expression
inviting state legislatures or courts to regulate deportation. 27 Thus, the
trial judge's actions in Quintero Morelos are consistent with the state
alien registration scheme that was invalidated under the Supremacy
Clause in Hines. That is, where Congress's "broad and comprehen-
sive" 28 plan for immigration already regulates the deportation of crimi-
nal aliens, there is no room for state judicial actions that also amount to
regulation in this field.
Furthermore, as opposed to the focus of the statute in DeCanas, the
focus of the trial judge's actions in Quintero Morelos was not merely a
"peripheral concern"'' 29 of a federal statutory scheme. Regulation of who
may lawfully remain in the United States and the circumstances under
which they may be expelled is a fundamental concern of immigration
law. 130  Unlike the statute in DeCanas, the judge's order here did not
have a merely "speculative and indirect impact on immigration.','
31
123. Id. at 599-600, 137 P.3d at 118.
124. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (emphasis added).
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. See supra Part 11.
127. See 142 CONG. REC. S11872-01, S11886 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of "estab-
lishing a unified system for removing [criminal] aliens").
128. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69 (1941).
129. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976).
130. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1231 (covering several aspects of the deportation scheme, includ-
ing the entry, inspection, arrest, detention, trial, and deportation of aliens).
131. 424 U.S. at 355.
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Rather, by "imposing a sentence of one day less than a year to avoid the
defendant's deportation," the trial judge impacted immigration in a very
real sense, in that he was essentially regulating who should be able to
stay in the United States.
132
Besides essentially regulating in a field occupied by Congress, the
judge's actions in Quintero Morelos addressed national concerns that
were beyond the police powers and local policy concerns of the state
court. In contrast to the statute in DeCanas, which was actually com-
plementary to federal law,1 33 the judge's actions in Quintero Morelos had
no analog in federal law that the judge could simply claim to be aug-
menting at the invitation of Congress. Nor did the judge's actions further
a legitimate state interest, such as strengthening the local economy.,
34
While the statute in DeCanas was "fashioned to remedy local problems
... [operating] only on local employers, and only with respect to indi-
viduals whom the Federal Government has already declared cannot work
in this country,, 135 the impact of the judge's actions in Quintero Morelos
was not local at all. In fact, apart from attempting to help the defendant
avoid deportation, a purpose notably peculiar to one individual, there was
no apparent policy justification articulated by either the trial judge or the
court of appeals. Consequently, the judge's actions allowed a criminal
alien to remain not just in Washington, but anywhere in the United
States, ensuring that the defendant's conviction would not render him
deportable as an aggravated felon.
Apart from the question of field preemption, the DeCanas Court
mentioned but failed to reach the question of whether, even if the field
was not occupied to the exclusion of the state, the statute was nonethe-
less invalid because it conflicted with or frustrated federal law. 136 Fortu-
nately, as discussed below, other cases have reached this question. The
rationale utilized in these cases supports the argument that the sentence
in Quintero Morelos also violated the Supremacy Clause because it di-
rectly conflicted with federal law.
2. The Sentences Conflict with Federal Law
Though the Quintero Morelos court pointed out that matters his-
torically within a state's police powers are not preempted absent the clear
132. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 600, 137 P.3d 114, 119 (2006).
133. 424 U.S. at 361-62 ("[T]here is evidence ... that Congress intends that States may, to the
extent consistent with federal law, regulate the employment of illegal aliens.").
134. Id. at 355-56.
135. Id. at 363.
136. Id.
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and manifest intent of Congress, 137 the court did not actually analyze
Congress's intent with respect to deportation law. Had the court delved
into congressional action and purpose with respect to this area of law, it
could have found that the sentencing judge's actions were in direct con-
flict with federal law in at least two respects. First, the actions had an
effect essentially opposite to the intended mechanisms of deportation
law. Second, the judge's actions impacted federal immigration law in a
manner that Congress could not have contemplated when legislating in
this area.
Two previously discussed cases considered whether a conflict ex-
isted, under the Supremacy Clause, between state and federal immigra-
tion law: Hines v. Davidowitz138 and Toll v. Moreno.139 In each case, the
Court invalidated state statutes that conflicted with federal law, where
the state statutes had precisely the opposite effect intended by Congress
in enacting the federal legislation.
40
In Hines, the Court invalidated a state alien registration statute"'
that competed with analogous federal law in much the same way the sen-
tence in Quintero Morelos competed with federal deportation law. Illus-
trating the imprecise language often used in Supremacy Clause analysis,
the Hines Court said:
[I]n considering the validity of state laws in the light of ... fed-
eral laws touching the same subject, has made use of the follow-
ing expressions: conflicting; contrary to; ... repugnance; differ-
ence; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and
interference. But none of these expressions provides an infalli-
ble constitutional test or an exclusive ... yardstick. In the final
analysis ... [o]ur primary function is to determine whether...
the [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.
142
In holding that the state statute stood as an obstacle to federal law, the
Hines Court found it significant that the state statute conflicted with the
federal scheme by effectively setting up its own burdensome alien regis-
tration system. 143 The same conflict between state and federal law exists
in Quintero Morelos, inasmuch as the judge's actions worked to keep an
individual in the United States despite federal declarations that such
137. 133 Wash. App. at 600, 137 P.3d at 119.
138. 312 U.S. 52 (1941); see also supra notes 115-119.
139. 458 U.S. 1 (1982); see also supra notes 86-87.
140. Toll, 458 U.S. at 17; Hines, 312 U.S. at 52, 74 (1941).
141. 312 U.S. at 68.
142. Id. at 67.
143. Id. at 73-74.
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individuals should be amenable to deportation under a competing federal
scheme. 144
Comparable to the situation in Hines, the Court in Toll invalidated a
state law imposing discriminatory tuition charges on lawfully admitted
aliens because it conflicted with Congress's determination that such
aliens should be accorded in-state tuition. 145 The conflict between con-
gressional determinations and state law discussed in Toll is similar to that
found in Quintero Morelos. In enacting laws aimed at deporting crimi-
nal aliens, Congress could not have contemplated the conflicting impact
of actions by state sentencing judges to prevent the deportation of the
same individuals. Whether by imposing higher tuition rates on individu-
als whom Congress intended to benefit from lower in-state rates, or by
sentencing a defendant to defeat deportation for conduct that Congress
intended to render one deportable, the states acted in direct conflict with
federal law. Additionally, though the Quintero Morelos court com-
mented that "[s]tate court judges often make decisions mindful of federal
implications," 146 such recognition is not necessarily consistent with the
Supremacy Clause. In this case, and in similar actions by state judges
throughout the country, such mindfulness undermines and obstructs fed-
eral law.
3. Where Criminal Courts Cannot Mandate
Deportation, They Cannot Prevent Deportation
Though case law that is directly on point respecting the legality of
state judges acting to prevent federal deportation efforts is lacking, there
is a large body of case law reflecting that both state and federal criminal
courts generally lack power to impose deportation as a condition of sen-
tencing. At the state level, a number of courts have held that judges vio-
late the Supremacy Clause when they order, as part of an alien defen-
dant's sentence, that the defendant leave the United States and not re-
turn.147 At the federal level, where judges cannot, by virtue of their fed-
eral status, violate the Supremacy Clause, courts have nonetheless held
that federal criminal courts are generally without authority to order
144. See supra Part I.B.
145. 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982).
146. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 600, 137 P.3d 114, 119 (2006).
147. See State v. Patel, 770 P.2d 390 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Antonio-Antimo, 29
P.3d 298 (Colo. 2000); Torros v. State, 415 So. 2d 908 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Rojas v. State, 450
A.2d 490 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982); State v. Pando, 1996-NMCA-078, 122 N.M. 167, 921 P.2d
1285; Hernandez v. State, 613 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App
381, 993 P.2d 894.
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deportation at the time of sentencing.148 While case law holding that fed-
eral judges are without power to order deportation does not implicate the
Supremacy Clause, such holdings are nonetheless instructive. Because
federal criminal courts generally cannot mandate deportation, there is an
even stronger argument that state courts lack a power to either mandate
or prevent deportation.
(a) State Courts Cannot Order Deportation
Courts in a number of states have held that it is a violation of the
Supremacy Clause for a state judge to impose deportation as a condition
at the time of sentencing. 149 For instance, in State v. Arviso, the appellate
court dealt with the question of whether the trial court had the authority
to order that the defendant's sentence be "suspended on condition the
defendant not return to the United States."' 150 In holding that the state
judge was without authority to impose such a condition at sentencing, the
appellate court stated:
Congress . . . has assigned the United States Attorney General
the sole power to exclude aliens, leaving no role for the ... judi-
ciary in such matters in conjunction with sentencing criminal de-
fendants 1'. . . . The supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution dictates that federal immigration law, not the decision of
the trial court in this case, controls the circumstances under
which appellant may or may not re-enter the United States.
52
Thus, a court exceeds its discretion when sentencing "a criminal
defendant in such a manner as to assume the power to control the
... exclusion of aliens."'
' 53
Because it is a violation of the Supremacy Clause for a state judge
to act to compel deportation as part of a sentence, it is arguably equally
impermissible for a judge to act to effectively prevent deportation. In
both instances the federal government possesses explicit and exclusive
control over the area of deportation. While the judge's "order" of
148. See, e.g., Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Phom-
machanh, 91 F.3d 1383 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanchez, 923 F.2d 236 (Ist Cir. 1991);
United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1990).
149. See cases cited supra note 147.
150. 1999 UT App 381, 2, 993 P.2d 894.
151. Id. 6 (quoting David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety, in Criminal Case, of Federal
District Court Order Restricting Defendant's Right to Re-enter or Stay in United States, 94 A.L.R.
FED. 619 (1998)).
152. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. State, 613 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
153. Id. (quoting David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety, in Criminal Case, of Federal Dis-
trict Court Order Restricting Defendant's Right to Re-enter or Stay in United States, 94 A.L.R. FED.
619 (1998)).
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deportation in Arviso was express, 154 the judge's modified sentence in
Quintero Morelos was the functional equivalent. In other words, a new
sentence of 364 days' 55 was essentially an order that the defendant not be
deported under a particular statute. Additionally, actions like those of
the trial court in Quintero Morelos are much more effective than those of
judges in cases such as Arviso. In Arviso, the judge's order requiring
deportation, while a violation of the Supremacy Clause, neither com-
pelled nor prevented immigration authorities from initiating proceedings
to deport the defendant. In other words, federal officials were free to
ignore the state sentencing judge's invalid deportation order and could
still choose whether to initiate deportation proceedings against the de-
fendant. Conversely, in Quintero Morelos,'56 Kravchenko,157 and
Savchak,'58 the judges' sentences of 364 days rather than 365 days for a
crime of violence took the convictions out of the definition of aggravated
felony for immigration purposes.' 59 This left federal authorities no dis-
cretion at all for that ground of deportability.160 Consequently, the fed-
eral government was deprived of the choice of whether to initiate depor-
tation proceedings against an alien by virtue of the state judges' actions.
(b) Federal Criminal Courts Generally
Cannot Order Deportation
Federal courts have also spoken to the intersection of sentencing
and deportation in a number of cases. The concern in these cases was
not the Supremacy Clause, because the universe in question was entirely
federal. Rather, the concern was whether a federal district court had the
authority to order an alien deported at imposition of a criminal sentence,
and whether such orders infringed on the power of the Executive
Branch.161 Though the cases do not engage in Supremacy Clause analy-
sis, their holdings outline in detail the role of the criminal courts in rela-
tion to immigration authorities and the importance of leaving discretion
in deportation matters to the Attorney General. Considering that federal
appeals courts have consistently held that federal district courts generally
cannot mandate deportation as part of a sentence in the absence of a
154. Id. 4.
155. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 595, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (2006).
156. Id. at 600, 137 P.3d at 119.
157. State v. Kravchenko, No. 04-C-02027-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 2004).
158. State v. Savchak, No. 04-C-02097-9 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 2004).
159. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(F) (2006) (defining the term "aggravated felony" as a crime of
violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year).
160. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (stating that an alien convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable); see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
161. See cases cited supra note 148.
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government request, 62 it follows that state courts lack such power in ei-
ther mandating or preventing deportation.
One example of the federal courts' view of the propriety of immi-
gration considerations at sentencing is presented in United States v. Jalil-
ian.163  In Jalilian, a federal appeals court analyzed the question of
whether a federal district court judge had exceeded his authority by con-
ditioning the defendant's probation in part on the requirement that he
"return to his native country... and ... not return to the United States
until legally authorized to do so."' 64 Holding that the district court judge
exceeded his authority, the court of appeals agreed with the defendant's
contention that the district court's sentence amounted to a de facto order
of deportation. 161 In support of its holding, the court noted that there was
no federal statute authorizing a federal district court to recommend that
an alien be deported. 166 Noting also that "[w]hether and how to initiate
deportation proceedings is exclusively the province of the Attorney Gen-
eral," the court reasoned that the district court judge's order raised "diffi-
cult questions about possible judicial independence and the Attorney
General's final authority" with respect to deportation. 
167
The Jalilian court seemed to base much of its holding on the impor-
tance of leaving discretion in deportation matters to the proper govern-
ment officials. Though the Jalilian court invalidated the lower court's
requirement that the defendant leave the country, the court upheld the
district court judge's authority to order the defendant not to reenter the
United States until legally authorized to do so. 168  This meant that,
though the district court judge could not order deportation, he could re-
quire that, if the defendant was deported, the defendant was not to return
to the United States without permission. Significantly, the court based
that part of its holding on the fact that the valid part of the district court
judge's order would still leave the determination of whether to deport the
162. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2007) provides for orders of deportation in a federal criminal court
but requires both the Attorney General, acting through the local U.S. Attorney, and immigration
officials to make a formal request, specifying the grounds for deportation, and to essentially act in
conformance with the procedures that would otherwise be observed in conventional deportation
proceedings before an immigration judge. This is distinguished from the cases discussed in this
Comment, where federal judges acted outside of statutory authority to essentially mandate a defen-
dant's deportation.
163. United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1990).
164. Id. at 447.
165. Id. at 448.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 448-49.
168. Id. at 449.
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defendant "in the hands of the Attorney General, where Congress deter-
mined the decision should lie, and not in thejudiciary."'
169
While the Jalilian court invalidated the district judge's de facto de-
portation order in the federal sentencing context, the new sentence in
Quintero Morelos intended to prevent deportation should be equally in-
valid in a state sentencing context. As in the cases where state judges
violated the Supremacy Clause by ordering deportation as part of crimi-
nal sentences,1 70 an important factor in similar federal cases is the discre-
tion left to the federal government in deciding whether or not to initiate
deportation proceedings.17 1 But again, the new sentence in Quintero Mo-
relos left the Attorney General no discretion at all. By comparison, in
Jalilian the Attorney General was free to ignore the federal judge's de
facto order of deportation. By using his sentencing power to ensure that
the conviction would not constitute an aggravated felony, however, the
judge's actions in Quintero Morelos were much more consequential. In
reducing the defendant's sentence by one day, the judge took a convic-
tion that would have subjected the defendant to placement in deportation
proceedings at the Attorney General's discretion and made it a nonde-
portable offense under the definition of aggravated felony. Moreover,
the one-day reduction in sentence could not have been intended to do
anything other than help the defendant escape possible deportation, as
state law provides for a maximum sentence of one year upon conviction
of a gross misdemeanor. 72 A sentence of 364 days rather than the statu-
tory maximum of 365 days serves no purpose other than to render a de-
fendant nondeportable under a particular federal statute 173 and is as inva-
lid under the Supremacy Clause as a criminal judge's order of deporta-
tion.
IV. IT IS NOT SOUND POLICY FOR A CRIMINAL COURT TO ATTEMPT TO
MITIGATE THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVICTION
Putting aside the legal arguments that state judges are violating the
Supremacy Clause, strong policy reasons also exist which weigh against
judges in criminal courts fashioning sentences to help defendants avoid
what the judges think are the harsh immigration consequences that may
follow. First, taking the important question of deportation out of the
hands of the unified immigration court system and dispersing it among
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See cases cited supra note 147.
171. See Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering the defendant to leave the country).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(2) (2006).
173. See 8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
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federal and state criminal courts invites inconsistency. Such sentences
merely supplant policy choices already made by Congress with those of
sentencing judges in disparate jurisdictions. Second, immigration law is
extremely complex' 74 and subject to the discretion of immigration offi-
cials within the confines of an independent immigration legal system.
These considerations favor maintaining such matters separate from sen-
tencing. Both federal and state courts have spoken to these policy ques-
tions. These courts have held that however severe the immigration con-
sequences of a criminal sentence might be, where the results are incon-
sistency and the making of policy choices that belong to Congress, the
courts should not act to ameliorate them.
175
A. Uniformity and Policy Concerns
At the federal level, allowing criminal courts to apply what they
consider to be fairness considerations concerning potential deportation
following sentencing invites inconsistency. For example, in Renteria-
Gonzalez v. INS,176 the Fifth Circuit took up the question of whether a
federal district court judge had the authority to fashion a writ vacating a
defendant's drug conviction in order to help the defendant avoid deporta-
tion. 77 While acknowledging the often sharp immigration consequences
of a criminal conviction, the Renteria-Gonzalez court held that the lower
court "lacked equitable authority to vacate the conviction," and that it
had no authority to "add new equitable remedies to the federal post-
conviction remedial scheme."'178 The court stated:
This principle applies with special force to the immigration laws.
When a court vacates an otherwise final and valid conviction on
equitable grounds merely to avoid the immigration-law conse-
quences of the conviction, it usurps Congress's plenary power to
set the terms and conditions of American citizenship and the ex-
ecutive's discretion to administer the immigration laws.
17 9
Continuing its discussion, the court also noted that the policy goal of
consistency in enforcement of the immigration laws "could never obtain
174. See, e.g., Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) ("We ... note the striking resem-
blance between some of the laws we are called upon to interpret and King Minos's labyrinth in an-
cient Crete. The Tax Laws and the Immigration and Nationality Acts are examples we have cited of
Congress's ingenuity in passing statutes certain to accelerate the aging process ofjudges.").
175. See, e.g., Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 2002); see also State v.
Cortez, 73 Wash. App. 838, 842, 871 P.2d 660, 662 (1994) ("There is no reason in ... policy which
suggests that a conviction should be vacated for circumstances existing at ... judgment.").
176. 322 F.3d at 812.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. (emphasis added).
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a uniform interpretation," were judges to be left with this type
of "unbridled discretion."'' 80 "If anyone is to have this kind of discretion
in the enforcement of the immigration laws," the court said, "it should be
the executive branch, which 'must exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate foreign relations."" 
8'
Another example of the federal bench wrestling with policy ques-
tions surrounding the immigration consequences of a conviction is
United States v. Aleskerova. 82 Aleskerova involved an alien convicted
of possession of stolen artwork who was sentenced to less than one year
in prison by the judge, in part because of the effect a longer sentence
would have had in terms of the possible denial of asylum and eventual
deportation. 183 Holding that the trial judge had abused his discretion in
imposing the lesser sentence, the court of appeals noted that, "Congress
has made a legislative choice that ... every alien who commits an aggra-
vated felony must be removed from the United States... [and] courts do
not have the authority to cast aside this legislative decision." 84 The
situation in Quintero Morelos is no different than in Aleskerova, where
the same legislative history exists. Quintero Morelos committed a crime
for which the normal sentence is the statutory maximum of one year in
the county jail;18 5 a sentence of this length would have rendered him an
aggravated felon.'8 6 And the court in Quintero Morelos did indeed "cast
aside" 187 Congress's legislative decision by ensuring that Quintero Mo-
relos would fall outside the definition of aggravated felon. As the
Aleskerova court put it, "just as a ... court is not free to undermine a
statutory prohibition by directly contravening its command, it may not do
so indirectly by fashioning a sentence specifically to ensure that the stat-
ute does not apply.'
' 88
In addition to concerns at the federal level with uniform application
of deportation laws and judicial attempts to act in equity, the Washington
Court of Appeals for Division III took up essentially the same questions
in State v. Cortez.189 Cortez is significant to this discussion for at least
two reasons. First, it was decided by the same appellate division that
later decided Quintero Morelos. Second, the court's holding in Cortez
180. Id. at 814.
181. Id. (quoting INS v. Abdu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
182. United States v. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 2002).
183. Id. at 300.
184. Id. at 301.
185. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(2) (2006).
186.8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
187. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d at 301.
188. Id. at 300.
189. State v. Cortez, 73 Wash. App. 838, 871 P.2d 660 (1994).
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contains a detailed policy argument against state courts acting to circum-
vent federal immigration consequences. 190 The opposite holdings by the
same appellate division in Cortez and later Quintero Morelos illustrate
both the problem of inconsistency when considering federal immigration
concerns in the state sentencing context and the related problem of sub-
stituting the policy of state judges for that of Congress. Where a single
division of a state appellate court is internally inconsistent in its policy
choices concerning the immigration consequences of sentencing, it is
better as a matter of law and policy to defer to Congress's uniform plan
for deportation.
In Cortez, the court discussed the question of whether the trial court
had the authority to vacate a defendant's conviction under Rule 7.8(b)(5)
of the Washington Superior Court Criminal Rules' 91 after "conclud[ing]
that deportation was too harsh. 1 92 In holding that the trial court acted
improperly, the appellate court pointed out that there was no defect in the
underlying conviction, because the defendant was advised of the poten-
tial federal immigration consequences of his guilty plea. 193 The court
also noted that the rule was meant to allow for vacating judgments only
in "extraordinary circumstances" and that none existed with the respect
to the defendant. 194 Leaving no doubt as to its feelings on the issue, the
court added: "Even if [extraordinary circumstances] were present, the
trial court exceeded its judicial power and infringed upon executive and
legislative authority because the sole purpose of the vacation was to af-
fect Mr. Cortez' immigration status."'9 5
The same appellate division that decided Cortez declined to extend
that holding's reasoning to Quintero Morelos.1 96 The court in Quintero
Morelos distinguished the holding in Cortez, in part because the defen-
dant in Cortez pleaded guilty and was advised pursuant to statute that
there might be federal immigration consequences of his plea.197 Thus,
there was no evidence that the defendant in Cortez did not understand his
rights.198  In contrast to the defendant in Cortez, the defendant in
Quintero Morelos was found guilty at trial. 199 Thus, the Quintero More-
los court was concerned that the defendant was unaware of the
190. Id. at 842, 871 P.2d at 662.
191. "The court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." WASH. CRIM. R. 7.8(b)(5) (2006).
192. 73 Wash. App. at 840, 871 P.2d at 661.
193. Id. at 840-41, 871 P.2d at 661-62.
194. Id. at 841-42, 871 P.2d at 662.
195. Id. at 840, 871 P.2d at 661 (emphasis added).
196. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 599, 137 P.3d 114, 118 (2006).
197. Id. at 598, 137 P.3d at 118.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 594, 137 P.3d at 116.
[Vol. 31:139
Federal Immigration Law and the Courts
immigration consequences that might flow from the length of his sen-
tence, information that had "critical consequences. 200
Although the Quintero Morelos court was concerned with the de-
fendant's apparent unawareness of the immigration consequences of his
sentence, there is no requirement that a defendant going to trial be ad-
vised of the potential immigration consequences of being found guilty.
20 1
Rather, the legislative history of the statute requiring advisement of im-
migration consequences indicates that it was of special concern that de-
fendants who were admitting guilt be made aware that their admissions
could have immigration consequences beyond whatever sentence they
might receive.20 2 Thus, while the defendant in Quintero Morelos might
not have been aware that the one-year sentence he initially received
could result in him being placed in a deportation proceeding, that was
one of the risks he ran by going to trial.20 3 Furthermore, the potential
immigration effects of a criminal sentence are a collateral, not direct,
consequence of the sentence.204 Therefore, there was neither a statutory
nor a constitutional requirement that Quintero Morelos be made aware of
such possibilities.20 5
In addition to discussing the legal reasons the lower court should
not have vacated the defendant's sentence, the Cortez court engaged in
an extended policy discussion of why it was unwise policy for state
courts to interfere in federal immigration matters.20 6 It is worth recount-
ing in part that discussion, because the Quintero Morelos court seems to
have abandoned some or all of its rationale. The Cortez court stated:
There is no reason in law or policy ... that a conviction should
be vacated for circumstances existing at the time the judgment is
entered. Though . . . the conviction result seems too harsh[,]
... it is a punishment specifically provided for under federal law
.... Congress establishes the criteria governing deportation of
aliens convicted of certain offenses. The role of the judiciary...
200. Id. at 597, 137 P.3d at 117.
201. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200(2) (2006). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200(i) (2006).
203. Thus, this part of the holding in Quintero Morelos undermines, to an extent, the policy
concerns expressed in state statute with respect to aliens pleading guilty. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.40.200(1) (2006) ("[It] is the intent of the legislature ... to promote fairness ... by requiring
... that acceptance of a guilty plea be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special conse-
quences .... ). Under the reasoning of the court in Quintero Morelos, an alien defendant could
refuse to disclose his or her status to the court and then proceed to trial, only revealing his or her
status strategically in order to claim neglect by defense counsel if the eventual sentence makes him
or her deportable. See Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. at 597, 137 P.3d at 117.
204. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
206. State v. Cortez, 73 Wash. App. 838, 842-43, 871 P.2d 660, 662 (1994).
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does not extend to imposing procedures that merely displace
congressional choices of policy.' °7
Thus, the court in Cortez acknowledged that however burdensome
the immigration consequences of a conviction might be, that alone was
not grounds for vacating the lower court's judgment. Yet, whether one
refers to it as "excusable neglect ' 208 or something else, the "sole pur-
pose" in the cases of Cortez and Quintero Morelos "was to affect [the
defendant's] immigration status. 20 9 The court in Cortez reasoned that
such a purpose was not a proper role for the judiciary; 210 consequently,
each time a judge makes a similar choice, he or she is using policy to
circumvent the operation of federal law.
Apart from the issue of whether relief was available under the rules
of criminal procedure, the court in Cortez also faced the question of
whether the lower court had the authority to vacate the defendant's
judgment purely on equitable grounds, 21' similar to the analysis the court
undertook in the federal context in Renteria-Gonzalez.212 Relying on
legal underpinnings similar to those used by the Renteria-Gonzalez court,
the court in Cortez held that where "we have a delicately balanced sys-
tem. . . that depends on a separation of powers," the trial court's "purely
equitable" use of its writ amounted to "an end run around properly en-
acted immigration legislation., 213 These policy concerns, which the Cor-
tez court stated so well and so emphatically, have not changed. Thus, it
is unclear why such concerns would not be equally applicable in
Quintero Morelos, other than to suggest that the court today is simply
making a different policy choice. That choice is one that undermines the
federal government's efforts in the area of immigration enforcement.
B. A Criminal Court Is Not the Proper Forum to
Address Complex Federal Immigration Issues
Not only did the sentencing judge in Quintero Morelos make a pol-
icy choice that ran counter to the intent of Congress, but the effects of
such choices in general are also of dubious use to alien defendants, who
may be provided false comfort by a state judge lacking adequate knowl-
edge of immigration law. First, state judges may be unaware that an
207. Id. at 842, 871 P.2d at 662.
208. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. at 597, 137 P.3d at 117.
209. Cortez, 73 Wash. App. at 840, 137 P.2d at 661.
210. Id. at 842, 871 P.2d at 662.
211. Id. at 842-43, 871 P.2d at 662-63.
212. Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 812 (5th Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 176-
181 and accompanying text discussing the holding in Renteria-Gonzalez.
213.73 Wash. App. at 843, 871 P.2d at 663.
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alien defendant can sometimes be subject to deportation under more than
one provision of federal law for the same conviction. Second, as a
threshold matter, the question of which provision of deportation law ap-
plies will turn on whether an alien was lawfully admitted to the United
States or entered unlawfully. Third, the prosecutorial discretion avail-
able to immigration officials means that a sentence subjecting a defen-
dant to deportation does not ensure that the alien will be arrested by im-
migration officials. Finally, there are provisions in federal law excepting
aliens from deportation in certain circumstances. The overall complexity
of these issues suggests that the only appropriate venue for deciding
them is the immigration court system.
Convictions under state law can sometimes render an alien deport-
able under more than one section of federal law. The defendant in
Quintero Morelos was convicted of Assault in the Fourth Degree, Do-
214mestic Violence. As discussed above, a sentence of one year or more
would make the defendant an aggravated felon215 for deportation pur-
poses. In addition, an alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United
States is subject to the initiation of deportation proceedings upon convic-
tion of an aggravated felony.216 But even if the sentence does not meet
the threshold to qualify as an aggravated felony, an alien who has been
lawfully admitted to the United States can be rendered deportable simply
because the conviction involves domestic violence.21 7 Additionally, an
alien who has been lawfully admitted to the United States can be made
deportable upon conviction of a "crime of moral turpitude," for which a
sentence of one year or more may be imposed, so long as the conviction
takes place within a certain number of years from the alien's last admis-
sion to the United States.218 In other words, regardless of the actual sen-
tence imposed, many crimes, including some assault convictions, will
make an alien amenable to deportation. Therefore, the fact that there will
sometimes be more than one way an alien can be placed in deportation
proceedings for the same conviction only underscores the fact that state
sentencing judges are not equipped to consider and address potential
immigration consequences.
214. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 594, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (2006).
215. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(F) (2006).
216. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
217. Id § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
218. Id § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). But see Annotation, What Constitutes "Crime Involving Moral
Turpitude" Within Meaning of § 212(a)(9) and 241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8
US.C.A. § 1182(a)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or
Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480 (2007) (explaining that crimes
such as simple assault often do not involve moral turpitude for purposes of establishing deportabil-
ity).
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Aside from the fact that a single conviction may fall under more
than one ground of deportability, the threshold question for operation of
the statutes is whether the alien has been lawfully admitted to the coun-
try. The majority of aliens placed in deportation proceedings each year
are those who were never lawfully present in the United States to begin
with. 219 The provisions for deportation of lawfully admitted aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies or crimes of domestic violence generally do
not apply to aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States. 2 °
Consequently, if a defendant in a state criminal case is already unlaw-
fully present in the United States, it does not necessarily matter what sen-
tence the judge imposes, because, as a baseline, such alien defendants are
subject to possible deportation based merely on their unlawful pres-
ence. 2
2 1
While the question of an alien defendant's lawful or unlawful pres-
ence in the country would be critical to a state court judge's efforts to
craft a sentence to avoid the alien's deportation, there is no requirement
in Washington that such a defendant disclose his or her citizenship to the
court, let alone his or her immigration status.222 Thus, a state court can-
not be sure whether any given defendant might face deportation since the
court cannot be sure whether the defendant is a U.S. citizen. Moreover,
even if a defendant does disclose to the state criminal court that he or she
is not a U.S. citizen, the question of whether the conviction will subject
the defendant to possible deportation will still turn in large part on
whether he or she is lawfully present in the United States. 223  Further-
more, regardless of what citizenship the defendant claims, only federal
immigration officials, not state court judges, can generally determine the
legal citizenship of a defendant. 24 Thus, while the trial judge in
Quintero Morelos stated, "I can tell you in good conscience if I had
known that [one day] would make a difference, I would have imposed
364 days,225 the reality is that the judge was in no position to know
219. In 2005, seventy-one percent of all deportations were of aliens who either were illegally
present in the United States or had attempted to enter the United States through fraud or misrepre-
sentation. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2005
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, at thl. 40 (2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS-2005-Yearbook.pdf.
220. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006) (stating that grounds of deportability for crimes involving
moral turpitude are applicable to those who have not been lawfully admitted to the United States); 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b) (2006) (providing for administrative orders of deportation in certain circumstances
for aliens unlawfully present in the United States based upon conviction of an aggravated felony).
221. See 8 U.S.C. § I 182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006).
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200(1) (2006).
223. See supra notes 221-25.
224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)-(b) (2006).
225. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 595, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (2006).
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whether his sentence would in fact make a difference at all. And the
judge was in no position to know how effective his sentence would be
because the question of deportability turns on the often-complex work-
ings of federal immigration law. Additionally, there are concerns about
a limiting principle here: If a state judge learns at sentencing that there
are possible federal immigration consequences that will follow, she could
conceivably try to chase down and ameliorate every such consequence if
she is focused on ensuring that the defendant is not subject to deporta-
tion.226 These concerns underscore the point that state judges should not
delve into immigration law. At worst, state judges are violating the Su-
premacy Clause and frustrating Congress's efforts because they are es-
sentially regulating immigration and achieving results that conflict with
deportation laws. At best, these judges are possibly giving alien defen-
dants false hope of avoiding deportation because the judges may not be
fully aware of the defendant's actual citizenship, lawful status, or which
federal ground of deportability might apply. Thus, it is better for the
judge to simply impose sentence, as she would for any other defendant,
and leave the potential operation of immigration law to the federal gov-
ernment.
State judges are not only unequipped to apply immigration law, but
they are also attempting to prevent something that may never occur.
Immigration officials have the ultimate prosecutorial discretion as to the
initiation of deportation proceedings, and a sentencing judge will gener-
ally not know whether officials plan to try and deport a particular defen-
dant. The court of appeals in Quintero Morelos noted that "a sentence of
365 days prompts federal immigration authorities to begin deportation
proceedings, while a sentence of even one day less.., does not., 227 But
while a one-day reduction in sentence might effectively prevent federal
immigration officials from placing a defendant such as Quintero Morelos
in deportation proceedings, the imposition of the full one-year sentence
would not guarantee the initiation of such proceedings. This is because
"an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce ... is ... generally
committed to an agency's absolute discretion. 228 Under the doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion,
226. See, e.g., Jennifer Welch, Defending Against Deportation: Equipping Public Defenders to
Represent Noncitizens Effectively, 92 CAL. L. REV. 541, 554 (2004) (advising defense attorneys to
ensure that aliens and the courts avoid any references in the court record during a guilty plea to the
alien's relationship to the victim, so as to avoid establishing the elements of a deportable crime of
domestic violence).
227. 133 Wash. App. at 595, 137 P.3d at 116 (emphasis added).
228. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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[e]ven when an immigration officer has reason to believe that an
alien is removable and that there is sufficient evidence to obtain a
final order of removal, it may be appropriate to decline to proceed
with that case. This is true even when an alien is removable based
on his or her criminal history.
229
Thus, the Quintero Morelos court was incorrect when it discussed how a
state sentence "prompts' 230 action by immigration officials. Rather, such
action is entirely within the discretion of the federal government, even
with respect to an alien convicted of a crime, such as Quintero Morelos.
Aside from ignoring the discretion accorded to immigration offi-
cials, state judges who try to stave off a defendant's deportation ignore
the fact that Congress knows how to create exceptions to its complex
scheme of deportability. 231 For example, in Renteria-Gonzalez the court
dealt with the question of whether a conviction that had been vacated
retained validity for the purpose of initiating deportation proceedings.2 32
The court, in holding that the vacated conviction could still count as a
ground of deportability, observed that the fact that Congress "included
no exception for judicially vacated convictions likely indicates that it
merely wanted to restrict to only the most directly accountable officers
the power to negate a conviction and thereby block deportation.' 2 33
Similarly, the court in United States v. Sanchez dealt with the ques-
tion of whether a federal district court had the authority to order a defen-
dant deported as part of his criminal sentence.2 34 In holding that the dis-
trict court had exceeded its authority in ordering deportation, the court of
appeals recognized the proper division of authority between the criminal
and immigration legal systems:
In other words, following appellant's surrender to Immigration
authorities, he is entitled to whatever process and procedures are
229. Memorandum from Doris Meisner, Comm'r, INS, to Reg'l Dirs. (Nov. 17, 2000) (2000
WL 33596819).
230. 133 Wash. App. at 595, 137 P.3d at 116.
231. See Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States
v. Phommachanh, 91 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1996) ("The courts are brought [in] ... only
after the Attorney General reaches a final decision on deportability."); United States v. Sanchez, 923
F.2d 236, 237 (Ist Cir. 1991) (holding that defendants are entitled to whatever process and proce-
dures are provided for under immigration law); Nass v. Local 348, Warehouse Prod., Sales and
Servs. Employees Union, 503 F.Supp. 217, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("Congress has determined what
shall constitute eligibility for lenient treatment, and Congress has set forth strict procedures for es-
tablishing rehabilitation and trustworthiness.").
232. Renteria-Gonzalez, 322 F.3d at 812.
233. Id. at 813; see also Phommachanh, 91 F.3d at 1385 ("The initial determination of whether
an alien is subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 falls outside the jurisdiction of the district
court.").
234. Sanchez, 923 F.2d at 237.
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prescribed by and under the Immigration and Naturalization Act
for one in appellant's circumstances, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether he is an alien. .. subject to deportation.235
Thus, these courts recognized that the federal immigration apparatus is
the only mechanism suitable for affording aliens in deportation proceed-
ings due process while adjudicating such questions as whether any ex-
ceptions to their deportability may apply. Therefore, there is no need for
resort to policy determinations by sentencing judges such as the one in
Quintero Morelos, especially where there are exceptions in the law, even
for certain criminal aliens.
Among the many exceptions to the application of grounds of
deportability,236 Congress has recognized that there are circumstances,
however narrow, in which an alien convicted of an aggravated felony
should be allowed to remain in the United States.237 For example, immi-
gration statutes provide that the federal government is restricted from
deporting an alien to a country where the alien's life or freedom would
be threatened.238 Though the statute excludes from the exemption aliens
who have been convicted of a "particularly serious crime," the statute
leaves to the Attorney General's discretion whether a conviction for an
aggravated felony resulting in a sentence of less than five years counts as
such a "serious crime., 239 In other words, as long as the alien's convic-
tion did not result in a sentence of five years or more, he or she might be
allowed to stay in the United States if immigration officials determine
that deportation would jeopardize his or her life or freedom.
While it would no doubt be difficult for a criminal alien to prove
that his life or freedom was in jeopardy in order to avoid deportation, the
statute still provides defendants such as Quintero Morelos, Kravchenko,
and Savchak with an opportunity to remain in the United States, notwith-
standing their convictions. Thus, while the sentencing judges in
Quintero Morelos, 240 Kravchenko,241 and Savchak2 42 were certainly mak-
ing policy choices in helping the defendants potentially avoid deporta-
tion, this was a choice that Congress had already contemplated under
particular circumstances. Under these circumstances, the judges were
not free to undermine Congress's choice. As the court explained in
Aleskerova, any judicial frustration with congressional immigration
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. See generally 3B AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens §§ 1475-1512 (2006).
237. See 8 U.S.C. 123 1(b)(3)(B) (2006).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591, 137 P.3d 114 (2006).
241. State v. Kravchenko, No. 04-C-02027-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 2004).
242. State v. Savchak, No. 04-C-02097-9 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. 2004).
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policy choices should be remedied through the legislative process, "'not
the ad hoc granting of [sentencing] departures.'
243
V. CONCLUSION
The federal immigration consequences that can flow from a crimi-
nal conviction are often severe. The impact of such convictions turns on
the complex intersection of such factors as the alien defendant's immi-
gration status,244 the date of his or her last entry into the United States,
245
the type of crime,246 and the length of sentence.247 A conviction can pre-
vent an alien from getting a green card and joining his or her U.S. citizen
spouse, 248 prevent a permanent resident from securing the promise of
U.S. citizenship through naturalization, 249 and, in the case of a 365-day
sentence for Fourth Degree Assault, possibly lead to permanent250 exile
from the United States. The hardships fall not only upon the alien but
also upon his or her family members, who can face the difficult choice of
either remaining in the country and being separated from their loved one
or leaving with him or her, which effectively amounts to a de facto de-
portation of innocent spouses and children.
One day-twenty-four hours-can make all the difference. The
human interests in a case that could trigger deportation may be compel-
ling; this is particularly true where, as in Quintero Morelos, the reduced
sentence did not change the actual time spent in jail by the defendant. 1
State court deference to federal regulation of immigration, however, is
not only legally mandated under the Supremacy Clause but also recog-
nizes that the federal system is a more appropriate setting for deciding
the complex issues presented in a deportation proceeding. Otherwise, it
is fair to ask where a limiting principle might lay. If a state court can
short-circuit the entire immigration legal process through a reduction in
sentence, removing any discretion the government has and preventing
any recourse to the immigration courts, what other policy choices might
a court make for similar reasons? This raises the specter of state judges
constantly attempting to dodge the various grounds of deportability in
their sentences because they have determined that the potential
243. United States v. Aleskerova, 300 F.3d 286, 300 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Restrepo, 999 F.2d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1993)).
244. See supra Part IV.B.
245. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 459-63 (1963).
246. See supra Part IV.B.
247. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
248. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006).
249. See id. § 1427.
250. See id § 1326(b).
251. State v. Quintero Morelos, 133 Wash. App. 591,595, 137 P.3d 114, 116 (2006).
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consequences of a standard sentence are too harsh. The state courts that
sentenced Quintero Morelos, Kravchenko, and Savchak based their sen-
tences on this policy choice.
It seems unlikely that, as they beat and stabbed Micah Painter based
on apparently nothing more than his sexual orientation, Kravchenko and
Savchak considered that their hatred and violence might result in their
deportation to a country that they had fled, ironically, to escape persecu-
tion.252 To an extent, the criminal justice system worked as it should.
These men were arrested, convicted, and punished. Criminal convictions
always have consequences beyond loss of liberty; some more tangible
than others.253 But ultimately, a judge cannot control for every ill that
may flow from the sentence he or she imposes.
Equity has its place. Where the federal government has spoken so
pervasively and so adamantly to the issue, however, this particular choice
is not one judges are free to make. Congress has promulgated a compre-
hensive set of immigration laws, particularly surrounding deportation,
which will not accommodate a shadow system of regulation by state sen-
tencing judges in violation of the Supremacy Clause.254 Moreover, even
if Congress were to welcome state regulation of immigration consistent
with the federal scheme, state sentences crafted to avoid deportation
would still violate the Supremacy Clause because they directly conflict
with that federal scheme.255 Furthermore, in light of the fact that several
state courts have already held that it is a violation of the Supremacy
Clause for a state sentencing judge to order a defendant deported, it
should likewise be a violation for a state judge to prevent a defendant's
deportation.256 Finally, if an alien defendant is not required to disclose
his citizenship or immigration status to the cour&57 and the judge is not
equipped to apply immigration law,258 there is nothing favoring either the
disclosure or consideration of potential immigration consequences at sen-
tencing as a matter of policy.
Whether it is a day when one is victimized by a brutal crime, or
whether it is a day that results in no longer being allowed to stay in one's
adopted home country, one day can make all the difference.
252. Clarridge, supra note 18, at B1.
253. See, e.g., Pinard & Thompson, supra note 1, at 585-90.
254. See supra Part IV.D.1.
255. See supra Part IV.D.2.
256. See supra Part IV.D.3.
257. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.40.200(1) (2006); see also supra note 203 and accompanying
text.
258. See supra Part IV.B.
259. See, e.g., Castro, supra note 5, at BI (reporting that Micah Painter stated that, in the wake
of the attack, he had never felt so bad in his life); see also Sam Skolnik, Derogatory Taunts Came
Before Assault, Victim Says at Hate-Crime Trial, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 2005, at
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BI (noting that Painter's voice began to crack as he recounted the trauma he experienced during the
attack).
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